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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO
CONTINGENCY FEE RESTRICTIONS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
STATUTES
CASEY L. DWYER
INTRODUCTION
During a January 2004 speech at an Arkansas medical center,
President Bush remarked, “[W]e’ve got too many darn lawsuits, too
many frivolous and junk lawsuits that are affecting people. . . . [W]e
need medical liability reform to make sure that medicine is affordable
and available. . . . Lawsuits don’t heal patients. That’s a fact.”1
Despite the fact that medical malpractice reform has been the subject
of political speeches and legislation for nearly three decades, it
continues to attract a great deal of attention from both state and
federal politicians who aim to solve the perceived medical
malpractice crisis.2 With health care costs continuing to soar,
frustrated consumers and voters have proven to be receptive
audiences for politicians with legislative reform proposals. Many of
the proposed reforms, however, have also drawn sharp criticism from
groups like consumer watchdogs and trial lawyer associations.3

Copyright © 2006 by Casey L. Dwyer.
1. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Baptist Health Medical Center, Little
Rock, Arkansas (Jan. 26, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/01/20040126-3.html).
2. See Libby Sander, 2005 Settlement Survey: Looking Ahead to Litigation under the MedMal Caps, CHI. LAW., Oct. 2005 (noting that in 2005 alone, more than 500 bills addressing
medical liability reform were introduced in forty-eight state legislatures).
3. Whether a medical malpractice crisis actually exists is a subject of much contention. As
one commentator put it:
Depending on one’s perspective, there is too much medical malpractice litigation or
not enough; contingent fee arrangements create an obscene form of bounty hunting
or are absolutely necessary to ensure justice; physicians should not be second-guessed
by those too dumb to avoid jury service or the jury system works just fine; and
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In an effort to reduce medical malpractice costs, reformers in the
early years of the twenty-first century have focused on reducing
contingency fees—fee arrangements in which the lawyer represents
4
the client for a fixed percentage of the amount recovered. The most
common proposal to reduce medical malpractice costs has
traditionally been to place a cap on noneconomic damages. Since at
least 2003, however, commentators and insurance companies have
challenged the effectiveness of such caps in reducing medical
malpractice insurance premiums, prompting the shift to contingency
fee reform efforts.5 Proponents of such reform argue that the
contingency fee system creates incentives for lawyers to take on
numerous nonmeritorious cases that have little likelihood of success,
in expectation that the windfall from a few successful cases will
exceed the cost of the rest.6 Even if the lawsuits are unsuccessful,
however, insurance companies must still expend resources to defend

legislators who enact tort reform are protecting fat-cat doctors or have prudently
restrained a tort system run amok.
David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and System Reform: Of Babies and Bathwater, 19
HEALTH AFF. 258, 258 (2000).
4. See A.B.A. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON CONTINGENT
FEES, REPORT ON CONTINGENT FEES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 3 (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/tips/contingent/MedMalReport092004DCW2.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2006) (“Attorney contingent fees have become the focus of efforts by medical professionals and
allied organizations to address medical liability problems.”).
5. A memorandum from The Medical Protective Company, the largest malpractice
insurance company in the United States, argues that recent legislation in Texas capping
noneconomic damages at $250,000 will not result in a significant decrease in medical malpractice
payouts and thus insurance premiums. “Noneconomic damages are a small percentage of total
losses paid. Capping noneconomic damages will show loss savings of 1.0%.” Memorandum from
Melissa Coker, Regulatory Specialist, The Medical Protective Company, to Hon. Jose O.
Monlemayor, Ins. Comm’r, Tex. Dep’t of Ins. (Oct. 30, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). But see Terry Maxon, Hospitals Finding Healthy Savings: Liability Insurance Costs
Have Been Eased by Proposition 12, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 23, 2004, at 1D (reporting
the Christus Health System, which owns or manages forty-eight Texas hospitals and facilities,
would likely save $21 million on medical liability insurance in 2004 due to the Texas tort reform
legislation); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact
of State Tort Reforms, W4 HEALTH AFF.—WEB EXCLUSIVE 20, 26 (Jan. 21, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.20v1.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2006)
(finding that states that had enacted damage caps had 17.1 percent lower medical malpractice
premiums than those that had not).
6. See CONG. OF THE U.S., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM:
EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 8 (June 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/
doc5549/Report.pdf (noting that contingency fees “create incentives for attorneys to take on a
large number of cases, each with a low probability of success, with the expectation that the fees
earned from the successful cases will be large enough to subsidize the unsuccessful cases”).
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7
them and may even settle nonmeritorious claims for fear of adverse
jury verdicts. Proponents also argue that plaintiffs, not lawyers,
deserve the bulk of any damage awards.8 Opponents of contingency
fee reform, however, stress that contingency fee arrangements allow
access to the courtroom for plaintiffs who would otherwise be unable
to risk paying high fixed hourly rates with the possibility of no
9
financial return. Thus, measures to restrict contingency fees could
hurt the poor’s ability to file personal injury lawsuits.
In an attempt to curb excess contingency fees and thereby reduce
medical malpractice litigation expenses, the federal government has
repeatedly proposed comprehensive national medical malpractice
10
reform bills that include limitations on contingency fees. Although
the malpractice reform bills have passed the House of
Representatives the past two years, they have failed to make it out of
the Senate. Contingency fee reform has been more successful at the
state level with many states enacting statutes, court rules, or even
passing constitutional amendments to limit the percentage of medical
malpractice awards that attorney’s may collect.11 These statutes have
been repeatedly attacked in state courts as a violation of due process,
the right to counsel, separation of powers, and most often equal
protection. The attacks have had mixed results, with the majority of
states upholding the statutes as constitutional and two states
invalidating their laws as unconstitutional.12 The main difference
between the two camps is that courts upholding the contingency fee
limiting statutes under equal protection claims have found that such
statutes are an effective measure to reduce medical malpractice costs,
whereas those courts invalidating the statutes have found the statutes

7. See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICA’S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS (Feb. 2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr_tp.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2006) (“In
cases where [the plaintiff’s] claims were dropped or dismissed, costs to defendants averaged
$17,408. In cases that went to trial and the defendant prevailed, the average cost jumped to
$87,720.”).
8. See, e.g., Dean J. Kereiakes & James T. Willerson, Health Care on Trial: America’s
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 109 CIRCULATION 2939, 2941 (2004).
9. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
12. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (N.H. 1980) (holding that New Hampshire’s
sliding scale limitation on contingency fees in medical malpractice claims violated the equal
protection clause); Heller v. Frankston, 464 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s sliding scale limitation on contingency fees violated the separation of powers
clause), aff’d on other grounds, 475 A.2d 1291, 1296–97 (Pa. 1984).
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13
ineffective at reducing costs. Strikingly, although efficacy seems to
determine whether a state statute passes constitutional review, and
although legal decisions in these states have purported to determine
whether reform measures are effective, none of the courts have given
substantial empirical support for their findings.
This Note analyzes the available empirical evidence to determine
the efficacy, and thus constitutionality, of contingency fee limiting
statutes in reducing the medical malpractice payouts and medical
malpractice insurance premiums. Part I of this Note reviews the
current status of contingency fee limitations in state and national
legislatures and at the ballot box. Part II analyzes the equal
protection argument against contingency fee limitations. Part III
examines theoretical arguments and existing empirical studies
regarding how contingency fee limitations influence the cost of the
medical liability system. Part IV provides new empirical data to
determine how contingency fee limitations influence medical
malpractice premiums. This Note concludes that although the efficacy
of contingency fee limitations in limiting health care costs is not
entirely clear, there is sufficient support for contingency fee statutes
to pass rational basis review, which is the controlling standard under
an equal protection analysis.

I. THE STATUS OF CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITATIONS IN THE
LEGISLATURES AND AT THE BALLOT BOX
National medical malpractice reform, including contingency fee
limitations, continues to draw attention from President Bush and his
supporters in Congress. In May of 2004, the House of Representatives
passed a comprehensive medical liability reform bill known as the
Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH)
Act of 2004.14 The HEALTH Act, modeled after California’s medical
malpractice reform,15 contains a sliding scale maximum on

13. See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 170–71 (Cal. 1985) (finding that
contingency fee limitations do not violate the equal protection clause because, among other
things, these limitations increase the chances that a plaintiff will accept a lower settlement and
decrease the amount of “marginal” malpractice claims brought), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990,
990 (1985); Carson, 424 A.2d at 839 (finding the relationship between the contingency fee
limiting statute and the containment of medical malpractice costs questionable).
14. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R.
4280, 108th Cong. § 5 (2004).
15. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003).
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contingency fees in medical malpractice actions ranging from 40
percent for the first $50,000 recovered to 15 percent for any amount
16
exceeding $600,000. The bill, however, failed to make it through the
17
Senate. The House of Representatives also passed a comparable bill
in 2003, but similarly failed to obtain the sixty votes necessary to end
a potential filibuster.18 Representative Rahm Emmanuel, a Democrat
from Illinois, compared the congressional attempts at medical
malpractice reform to the movie Groundhog Day. “[I]n the movie Bill
Murray’s character relived the same day over and over again, and
here in Congress we are doing the same. . . . We took [medical
malpractice reform] up in March of 2003. Nothing happened, but we
took it up again.”19 Although medical malpractice reform has the
support of President Bush and stronger support in the 109th
Congress, it is still unlikely that such sweeping medical malpractice
reform will pass at the national level, leaving medical malpractice
reform in the province of the states.
Currently, twenty-four states place some form of statutory or
regulatory limit on the contingency fee a lawyer can collect in medical
malpractice cases. The most common type of this statute places a
maximum on the percentage of allowable attorneys’ fees based on a
20
sliding scale that decreases the percentage as the award gets higher.

16. See id. (limiting an attorney’s contingent fee in medical malpractice actions to 40
percent of the first $50,000 recovered, 33 percent of the next $50,000, 25 percent of the next
$500,000, and 15 percent of any amount exceeding $600,000).
17. See Sander, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that after the failure of the 2004 bill to pass the
Senate, President Bush “urged Congress to send him a ‘meaningful, real medical liability bill’ to
sign in 2005”).
18. Dr. William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice
Premiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 465–66 (2004).
19. 150 CONG. REC. H4141 (daily ed. June 15, 2004) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel).
20. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in
medical malpractice actions to 40 percent of the first $50,000 recovered, 33 percent of the next
$50,000, 25 percent of the next $500,000, and 15 percent of any amount exceeding $600,000);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c (West 2004) (limiting attorney’s contingent fees in “personal
injury, wrongful death or damage to property” claims to 33 percent of the first $300,000
recovered, 25 percent of the next $300,000, 20 percent of the next $300,000, 15 percent of the
next $300,000 and 10 percent of any amount exceeding $1.2 million); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
6865 (2004) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in medical malpractice actions to 35 percent of
the first $100,000 recovered, 25 percent of the next $100,000, and 10 percent of any amount
exceeding $200,000); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1114 (West 2003) (limiting attorney’s
contingent fees in medical malpractice actions to 33 percent of the first $150,000 recovered , 25
percent of the next $850,000, and 20 percent of any amount exceeding $1 million); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2961 (2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in professional negligence
actions to 33 percent of the first $100,000 recovered, 25 percent of the next $100,000, and 20
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In 2004, Nevada imposed a statutory sliding scale limitation on
contingency fees, doing so not by legislative action but by a 2004
21
voter initiative entitled “Keep Our Doctors in Nevada.” A few states
have rejected the sliding scale model and imposed a fixed maximum
contingency fee, varying from a lenient 50 percent to a more stringent
15 percent.22 Still other states have decided against set limits on
contingent fees and instead subject fee arrangements to judicial
review for reasonableness; these statutes usually contain guidelines
for determining reasonableness such as the time and labor required,
23
the result obtained, and the experience and ability of the lawyer.
percent of any amount exceeding $200,000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60I (West 2003)
(limiting attorney’s contingent fee in medical negligence actions to 40 percent of the first
$150,000 recovered, 33 percent of the next $150,000, 30 percent of the next $200,000, 25 percent
of any amount exceeding $500,000, and further restrictions if claimant’s recovery minus attorney
fees does not cover claimant’s past and future medical expenses); N.J. CT. R. § 1:21-7 (West
2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in tort actions to 33 percent of the first $500,000
recovered, 30 percent of the next $500,000, 25 percent of the next $500,000, 20 percent of the
next $500,000, and a reasonable percentage approved by the court for any amount exceeding $2
million); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 474-a (McKinney 2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee
in medical, dental or podiatric malpractice actions to 30 percent of the first $250,000 recovered,
25 percent of the next $250,000, 20 percent of the next $500,000, 15 percent of the next $250,000,
and 10 percent of any amount exceeding $1.25 million); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.013 (West 2003)
(limiting attorney’s contingent fees in malpractice cases to 33 percent or 25 percent of the first
$1 million recovered, depending on when liability is stipulated, and 20 percent of any amount
exceeding $1 million).
21. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.095 (Supp. 2006) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in medical
malpractice actions to 40 percent of the first $50,000 recovered, 33 percent of the next $50,000,
25 percent of the next $500,000, and 15 percent of any amount exceeding $600,000); Michael
Bradford & Judy Greenwald, Voters Repeal California ‘Play or Pay’ Benefit Mandate, BUS. INS.,
Nov. 8, 2004, at 16 (noting that Nevada voters passed contingency fee caps and also rejected an
amendment that would have “eliminated limits to malpractice awards and prohibited caps on
attorney fees”).
22. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-18-1 (West 1999) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee to 15
percent of the amount recovered in medical malpractice actions in which defendant is
represented by patient’s compensation fund); MICH. CT. R. 8.121 (West Supp. 2004) (limiting
attorney’s contingent fee to 33 percent of damages in personal injury and wrongful death
actions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (West 2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee to 50
percent of the net recovery in all actions); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2004) (limiting attorney’s
share of punitive damage award to 20 percent in all actions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120
(West 2002) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee to 33 percent of damages in malpractice actions);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.5 (West 2002) (limiting attorney’s contingent fee to 33 percent of
amount recovered in medical malpractice actions).
23. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (2002) (allowing judicial review of attorney’s fees
on the request of either party in health care actions); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-15.5
(LexisNexis 2003) (requiring attorney fee arrangements to be approved by the court in all tort
actions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.138 (West 1997) (requiring court to determine reasonableness
of plaintiff’s attorney fee in medical malpractice actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-121b (2004)
(requiring judicial approval of attorney compensation in medical malpractice actions); MD.
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Discouraged by the Florida state legislature’s failed attempts at
medical malpractice reform, voters in that state resorted to
constitutional, as opposed to statutory or regulatory, measures to
limit contingency fees, and passed a constitutional amendment strictly
24
limiting the fees. Florida’s constitutional amendment is unique in
that it was not passed as part of a comprehensive medical malpractice
reform plan but as a stand-alone limitation on medical malpractice
contingency fees.25 The Florida amendment thus clearly demonstrates
the importance of the contingency fee issue and attention that it is
receiving in medical malpractice reform.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO CONTINGENCY
FEE LIMITATIONS
Medical malpractice reform statutes emerged in the 1970’s and
were immediately attacked as violating various state and federal
constitutional provisions. Contingency fee limitations have been
challenged under numerous theories: separation of powers,26 the right
27
28
29
to counsel, due process, and most notably, equal protection. The
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-07(b) (West 1999) (requiring approval of disputed
attorney fees by court or arbitration panel in medical malpractice actions); NEB. REV. STAT. §
44-2834 (2004) (allowing judicial review of reasonableness of attorney’s fees at the request of
either party in medical malpractice actions); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.005 (West 2005)
(allowing judicial review of reasonableness of attorney’s fees at the request of either party in
any tort action); WYO. CONTINGENT FEES CT. R. 5(f) (2005) (allowing for petition of
reasonableness of contingent fee arrangement and providing presumptively reasonable sliding
scale arrangement dependent on whether the case lasts more or less than sixty days from the
filing date).
24. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (limiting attorney’s contingent fee in medical liability
actions to 30 percent of the first $250,000 recovered and 10 percent of any amount exceeding
$250,000). But see Chris Grier, Florida Medical-Malpractice Amendment Might Be
Circumvented, BESTWIRE, Nov. 30, 2004, available at LEXIS News & Business Library
(reporting that Florida lawyers are considering asking clients to waive their rights to capped
attorney’s fees as a condition of representation).
25. Prior to the 2004 amendment, Florida already had in place extensive statutory
regulations covering medical malpractice litigation. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768 (West
2001).
26. See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 172 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that “in light of this court’s inherent power to review attorney fee contracts
and to prevent overreaching and unfairness, the question of the appropriateness of attorney fees
is a matter committed solely to the judicial branch”) (citation omitted), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 990, 990 (1985). But see Heller v. Frankston, 464 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)
(holding Pennsylvania’s sliding scale limitation on contingency fees violated the separation of
powers clause), aff’d on other grounds, 475 A.2d 1291, 1296–97 (Pa. 1984).
27. See Roa, 695 P.2d at 169 (“The sliding scale schedule [of contingency fees] certainly
does not unconstitutionally impinge on a malpractice victim’s right to counsel.”).

05__DWYER.DOC

618

12/19/2006 5:10 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:611

Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, as well as similar
clauses contained in most state constitutions, guarantees that “all
30
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Those who
oppose fee limitations directed specifically at medical malpractice
actions may argue that such statutes violate the equal protection
clause by imposing inferior treatment on several parties: medical
malpractice victims as compared to other tort victims; plaintiffs’
lawyers as compared to defense lawyers; more severely injured
plaintiffs as compared to less severely injured plaintiffs;31 and poor
plaintiffs as compared to those with the financial means necessary to
hire lawyers on an hourly basis.
In evaluating an equal protection challenge, the courts first must
determine which of the three levels of review to apply. In general,
courts apply rational basis review—the most lenient form of review—
unless a suspect or quasi-suspect class is implicated or a fundamental
32
right is impacted. None of the numerous courts to consider the issue
have found that medical malpractice claimants or their lawyers
33
constitute a suspect class, and it is well established that heightened
scrutiny does not apply to laws discriminating against the poor.34
28. See id. at 166 (rejecting the argument that contingency fee limitations violate due
process by “impermissibly infring[ing] on the right of medical malpractice victims to retain
counsel in malpractice actions”).
29. Some plaintiffs have tried more novel attacks, but these have garnered little attention
by courts. In California, for example, challengers to the state’s limitation on contingency fee
statutes in medical malpractice cases claimed the statute violated the First Amendment right to
petition. Id. at 167 n.5. Calling the argument “creative,” the court nonetheless dismissed it with
a footnote. Id. (“Although the argument is creative, its logic clearly proves too much, for it
would preclude a state from imposing any limitation on attorney fees, no matter how
unconscionably high such fees might be . . . .”).
30. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
31. Arguably, contingency fee limitations, especially sliding scale limitations, have a greater
effect on claimants and counsel with more severe injuries, because their damage awards will be
higher. Thus, in these cases, the lawyers’ fees will be more severely limited than in cases with
lower damage awards.
32. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).
33. See DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009, 1016 (D. Del. 1981) (“Parties to a malpractice
action, whether plaintiffs or defendants, have never been held to be a suspect or a quasi-suspect
class for the purpose of equal protection analysis and indeed they do not possess any of the
characteristics . . . .”).
34. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (holding that
economic status does not constitute a suspect classification); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 471 (1977) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never held that financial need alone
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis”).
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Furthermore, although contingency fee limiting statutes implicate
certain rights, such as the right to contract and the right to be
compensated for injury, no court has found that such statutes impact
35
any fundamental rights. Thus, the majority of courts have applied
rational basis review to challenges to medical malpractice reform
statutes in general, and to contingency fee limitations specifically.
A few courts, however, have applied intermediate scrutiny in
evaluating equal protection claims against medical malpractice reform
statutes. In Arneson v. Olson,36 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
applied intermediate scrutiny to hold that North Dakota’s medical
malpractice reform statute violated the equal protection clause of the
37
federal and state constitutions. The court stated that for the medical
malpractice reform statute to be constitutional, there must be a “close
correspondence between statutory classifications and legislative
goals.”38 Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson v.
Maurer39 applied intermediate scrutiny to an equal protection
challenge of New Hampshire’s medical malpractice reform statute,
finding that the rights involved were “sufficiently important to
require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a
more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis
test.”40 The court in Carson recognized that such a heightened form of
scrutiny was not required by the federal Constitution,41 but opted to
use its power in interpreting the state Constitution “to grant
42
individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution requires.”

35. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980) (finding the “right to recover
for personal injuries” is not fundamental); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tenn. 1994)
(holding that the right to contract is “not a fundamental right which would trigger strict scrutiny
analysis”).
36. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
37. Id. at 136.
38. Id. at 134.
39. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
40. Id. at 830.
41. Id. at 831 (acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court has reserved
intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on gender and illegitimacy).
42. Id. (noting that the court had previously applied intermediate scrutiny to “economic
and social legislation and ordinances which did not involve distinctions based upon gender or
illegitimacy”). Despite the express statement of the court in Carson, however, it is questionable
whether a heightened form of scrutiny was in fact applied. See David L. Bearman, Case
Comment, Constitutional Law—Newton v. Cox: The Rationality of Tennessee’s Medical
Malpractice Contingency Fee Statute, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1555, 1575 (1995) (arguing that much
of the court’s language in Carson points to the fact that rational basis review, not intermediate
scrutiny, was actually used).
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These two decisions, however, have received little support from
43
courts or commentators. Given that no suspect class or fundamental
right is in question, the consensus is that rational basis review should
be applied to contingency fee limitations in medical malpractice
actions.44
Under the rational basis test, a statute will be upheld if “the
legislative classification . . . is rationally related to achievement of the
45
[legitimate] statutory purposes.” Employing this deferential test, it is
rare for courts to invalidate a statute. The party opposing the statute
has the extremely difficult task of proving that “the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
46
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” As long
as the relationship between the legislative classification and a
conceivable purpose of the statute is “debatable,” the statute will be
found constitutional under an equal protection challenge.47
Although it is rare for a statute to be found unconstitutional
using the rational basis test, several different types of medical
malpractice reforms have succumbed to equal protection challenges
48
under this test. All contingency fee limitations on medical
malpractice actions that have thus far been reviewed under the

43. But see R. Scott Jenkins & Wm. C. Schweinfurth, California’s Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 868–80
(1979) (discussing cases in which courts arguably applied a stricter form of review to medical
malpractice reforms through a balancing of interests).
44. See, e.g., Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 109–10 (Tenn. 1994) (“[T]he rational basis
test is the appropriate analysis to be employed when determining the constitutionality of
medical malpractice statutes.”); Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 199–206 (1990)
(arguing that rational basis review is the correct level of scrutiny for medical malpractice reform
legislation); Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee
Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 973 (1990) (“[C]ourts are correct to apply the rational basis
test in evaluating whether future limits on contingent fees violate equal protection.”). But see
Jenkins & Schweinfurth, supra note 43, at 872 (stating that “medical malpractice legislation,
because of its tenuous effect and the interests affected, may demand a higher level of judicial
scrutiny than other social and economic legislation”).
45. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981).
46. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
47. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
48. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 94 (R.I. 1983) (finding Rhode Island’s
medical malpractice reform unconstitutional under rational basis review because no medical
malpractice crisis existed); see also Robert W. George, Comment, Prognosis Questionable: An
Examination of the Constitutional Health of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose,
50 ARK. L. REV. 691, 716 n.131 (1998) (listing examples of cases in which courts found medical
malpractice reform statutes unconstitutional using rational basis review).
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rational basis test, however, have been upheld against equal
protection challenges. Generally, the stated purpose for most medical
malpractice reform legislation is to reduce the costs involved with
medical malpractice litigation in order to lower medical malpractice
insurance premiums, thus decreasing the cost of health care and
increasing the availability of physicians.49 Importantly, to pass the
rational basis test, contingency fee limitations need not be the most
effective means of combating rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums, but only a possible means.50 Courts have therefore held
that limiting the attorneys’ fees collected in medical malpractice
actions, as opposed to all tort actions, is a rational use of the
legislative power to curtail rising medical malpractice insurance
51
premiums. All of these courts’ holdings are made as conclusory
statements without reference to evidence supporting or denying the
efficacy of contingency fee limitations in stabilizing medical
malpractice insurance premiums. Although the rational basis test

49. For example, the purpose of the California contingency fee limiting statute was
explained as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State
of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in
a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the
medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion of
physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health care available to
citizens of this state. The Legislature, acting within the scope of its police powers,
finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide an adequate and
reasonable remedy . . . .
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 note (West 2003).
50. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 779 (Ill. 1986) (“[T]he legislature is not limited to
choosing the single, most effective remedy against the problem but rather may decide to attack
it along several fronts simultaneously.”).
51. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009, 1016 (D. Del. 1981) (“[I]t is rational to
limit attorney’s fees which may be collected in malpractice suits and not in other actions because
the limitation is also related to reducing malpractice insurance costs and, consequently, medical
costs.”); Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 170 (Cal. 1985) (“[T]he Legislature could
reasonably have determined that the provision would serve to reduce malpractice insurance
costs.”), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985); Bernier, 497 N.E.2d at 779 (“The legislature may
have reasonably believed that the limits on fees would expedite the resolution of disputes, act as
a disincentive for filing frivolous suits, and preserve to a plaintiff a greater part of his recovery,
and in those ways help reduce the malpractice crisis.”); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585, 602–03 (Ind. 1980) (“The disparate treatment accorded plaintiffs and counsel in
medical malpractice cases is the natural consequent of the fact that the Legislature sought in this
Act to protect the public interest adversely being affected by a curtailment of malpractice
insurance for health care providers.”); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tenn. 1994) (“It is
conceivable that the General Assembly concluded that the contingency fee cap . . . would
further the purposes of the Medical Malpractice Act by reducing malpractice insurance costs
and, therefore, reduce the cost of health care to the public.”).
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does not require state legislatures to produce evidence to support a
52
challenged statute’s purpose, empirical evidence regarding the
effects of contingency fee limitations on the costs of medical
malpractice litigation and insurance premiums would nonetheless be
useful for meaningful judicial review.
III. THE EFFECT OF FEE LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY COSTS
There are two main ways that contingency fee limitations could
affect medical malpractice litigation costs: first, by decreasing the
overall claim rate and second, by increasing the settlement rate.53
Contingency fee limitation statutes may decrease the overall claim
rate by discouraging plaintiff’s’ lawyers from bringing frivolous suits.
Although it is unknown exactly how many frivolous medical
malpractice suits are filed, one small study of medical malpractice
claims filed in New York found that only 17 percent of the claims
reviewed contained negligent treatment.54 Furthermore, over half of
the claims in the study lacked not only health care provider
55
negligence, but were void of medical injury altogether. More recent
and widespread data also support the inference that the number of
frivolous medical malpractice suits is higher than in other categories
of torts.56 Typically, tort plaintiffs are successful in approximately half
of trials, whereas medical malpractice plaintiffs are only successful in
57
approximately one quarter of trials. Although the lower percentage

52. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1980) (“States are not
required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments.”).
53. A third important indicator of medical liability costs, the amount paid per award, is
likely to be influenced relatively little by contingency fee limitations because evidence does not
show that nonmeritorious cases are awarded any less damages than meritorious cases.
54. See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 245, 245–51(1991).
55. Id.
56. See generally THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (Apr. 2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlc01.pdf (comparing the success rates of medical
malpractice claims and other tort claims).
57. Id. (“The overall win rate for medical malpractice plaintiffs (27 percent) was about half
of that found among plaintiffs in all tort trials (52 percent).”); see also NICHOLAS M. PACE ET
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS: JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 19 (2004) (“About 22 percent of
California medical malpractice trials during our study period resulted in a verdict in favor of one
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of plaintiff victories could be explained by a multitude of factors—for
example, complexity of cases, reluctance of juries to hold doctors
accountable, or difficulty in obtaining expert witnesses to testify
against defendant doctors—it does not change the fact that plaintiffs’
attorneys bring unsuccessful medical malpractice cases at a higher
rate than other tort cases.
Reducing the payoff for frivolous medical malpractice cases will
deter attorneys from bringing such cases. The effect of the most
common type of contingency fee statute—a sliding scale limitation on
fees—on the net recovery by attorneys is dramatic. In a study of
California medical malpractice lawsuits, researchers found that
California’s statutory limit on contingency fees reduced the average
attorneys’ fees between 1995 and 1999 by 46 percent.58 When
California’s cap on damages was combined with a sliding scale
59
limitation, attorneys’ fees were reduced by a total of 60 percent. It is
possible that California’s dramatic decrease in fees can be replicated
in other states by implementing a sliding scale fee limitation. Such a
drastic reduction in attorneys’ fees changes the economics for the
plaintiffs’ attorneys who bring medical malpractice suits, forcing them
to reexamine the risk they are willing to take. With less to gain from
successful suits, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be unable to file a multitude of
lawsuits of questionable merit while relying on one or two “windfall”
awards to offset the costs of unsuccessful suits. This means that to stay
profitable, plaintiffs’ lawyers will expectedly raise the threshold for
likelihood of success in determining which cases they choose to file.
In a 2004 report denouncing the spread of contingency fee
limitations, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on
Contingent Fees (Task Force) disputed the claim that contingent fee
60
limitations prevent frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits. The ABA
study undertook to “study the interaction of contingent fees and
medical malpractice litigation and determine whether changes in
current rules and practices might serve the interests of the public and

or more plaintiffs in the case (compared with 53 percent for all other types of trials in California
during this same period).”).
58. See PACE ET AL., supra note 57, at 36 (comparing what an attorney would have received
under a 33 percent flat fee with what the attorney would receive under California’s sliding scale
limitation in 257 medical malpractice trials between 1995 and 1999).
59. Id. Taking into account only the cap on damages and not the contingency fee
limitations, attorneys’ fees were reduced by 30 percent. Id.
60. See A.B.A. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON CONTINGENT
FEES, supra note 4, at 20 (“Logic suggests that contingent fees actually prevent frivolous suits.”).
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61
of individual victims of medical malpractice.” The study concluded
that states should not enact contingency fee limitations because such
limitations “risk compromising access to justice by medical
62
malpractice victims.” Instead of limiting contingency fees, the Task
Force suggested that states provide bar-supported public information
services to help potential clients find lawyers and negotiate fee
contracts, mandate a standardized disclosure by lawyers seeking to
represent medical malpractice plaintiffs, improve the enforcement of
existing procedural and ethical rules, and encourage the use of
alternative dispute resolution.63 The Task Force concluded that
adopting these measures would “not only improve client access to
justice but also enhance the ability of clients to establish fair and
informed terms of legal representation, including reasonable
contingent fee arrangements.”64
The ABA report’s logic, however, is flawed. In an effort to prove
that contingent fees have not produced an “explosion in medical
malpractice litigation” and that frivolous malpractice suits are not an
issue, the report describes state studies that show the number of new
tort lawsuits filed is stable or even declining in the first part of the
twenty-first century and that medical malpractice suits only make up
65
a small percentage of overall tort litigation. Considering that
contingency fees have been the primary payment method for
plaintiffs’ lawyers in most tort litigation for decades,66 it would not be
expected that such fee arrangements would have produced a jump in
the number of suits filed. Also, the fact that medical malpractice suits
make up a small percentage of overall tort claims is irrelevant to the
question of whether or not frivolous medical malpractice claims are
filed. There is no suggestion that medical malpractice attorneys are
more likely to use contingency fee arrangements than other tort
attorneys, so the more relevant question is whether the number of
medical malpractice suits filed per incident of medical malpractice is
equivalent to the rate of suit to rate of incident for other torts; this
question is not addressed by the ABA report.

61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 43–45.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Id. at 17.
66. For a historical background of the contingency fee arrangement, see Lester Brickman,
Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 29, 35–39 (1989).
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A more plausible criticism of the effect of contingency fee
limitations on the rate of medical malpractice claims is that such
limitations will not only prevent frivolous malpractice suits but
67
68
69
meritorious ones as well. Past studies show that only 2 to 12
percent of actual medical malpractice incidents result in a lawsuit.
This low filing rate may be the result of patients’ failure to detect
malpractice, patients’ reluctance to sue doctors, and the high cost of
investigation and litigation. In theory, sliding scale contingency fee
limitations could increase the number of meritorious suits that
lawyers bring. A lawyer who is able to charge an unlimited fixed rate
will gravitate toward cases in which the expected damages are high,
because the marginal time and cost to present a case would decrease
with higher awards. However, a lawyer who is subject to a sliding
scale rate that has a maximum award fixed below the normal fixed
contingency rate will find cases with lower expected damages more
appealing.70 Consequently, logic suggests that a meaningful reform of
contingency fees in medical malpractice cases would reduce the
amount of frivolous suits brought by decreasing the incentive for
lawyers to bring a multitude of suits regardless of the merits. It may
be the case, however, that as overall claim rates decrease, the number
of meritorious suits brought will actually increase.

67. See A.B.A. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRACTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON CONTINGENT
FEES, supra note 4, at 32 (“Elimination of, or significant constraints on, contingent fees would
make legal assistance available only to those injured persons who are wealthy. The poor, the
retired, African Americans, and women especially will suffer because they are often unable to
afford hourly fees.” (quoting Florida Senator Walter Campbell)).
68. A New York study found that one medical malpractice claim was brought for every 7.6
incidents of medical malpractice; but due to the frivolous claims included in this ratio, the actual
percentage of medical malpractice incidents that resulted in lawsuits was only 1.53 percent. See
Localio et al., supra note 54.
69. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 13 (1991) (finding only one
out of eight valid medical malpractice claims are ever filed).
70. For example, if two cases with the same probability of success are presented to a
lawyer, one having an expected award of $1 million and the other an expected award of
$250,000, the lawyer would receive $250,000 more in fees under a flat contingency fee of 33
percent from the $1 million case than the $250,000 case upon success of the case. If, however,
the lawyer was forced to use a sliding scale contingency rate such as the one in force in
California, the lawyer would earn only $147,500 more in fees from the $1 million case than the
$250,000 case. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003) (limiting attorney’s contingent
fee in medical malpractice actions to 40 percent of the first $50,000 recovered, 33 percent of the
next $50,000, 25 percent of the next $500,000, and 15 percent of any amount exceeding
$600,000). This reduction in fee more accurately reflects the decreasing marginal costs in terms
of time and effort by the lawyer, and makes the attorney more likely to accept the lower award
cases.
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The second way in which contingency fee limitations may reduce
medical liability litigation costs is by increasing the rate of settlement.
Approximately 85 percent of medical malpractice claims that are not
71
dropped or dismissed result in settlement. Fifteen percent of cases
result in trial with approximately one-quarter of those resulting in
verdicts for the plaintiff.72 These numbers show that insurance
companies are generally willing to settle meritorious claims for
amounts that plaintiffs and their attorneys find reasonable. By
decreasing the amount that the plaintiff’s attorney may charge in fees,
contingency fee limitation statutes consequently increase the amount
of a proposed settlement a plaintiff will retain. In determining
whether or not to accept a settlement offer, plaintiffs may look to
both the amount of the proposed settlement and the amount of the
settlement they, as plaintiffs, will take home. Contingency fee limiting
statutes will decrease the percentage of the settlement retained by the
lawyer and thus lower the threshold settlement offer necessary for
insurance companies to induce plaintiffs to settle. Attorneys will also
have a greater incentive under sliding scale contingency fee
limitations to accept a lower settlement offer. Because the attorney
receives a lower percentage of higher awards under such a system,
attorneys will have less incentive to risk sure money for the
opportunity of a large jury verdict. Whether plaintiffs’ or attorneys’
interests control the settlement decision, contingency fee limitations
will likely increase the number of cases insurance companies are able
to settle, and may even decrease the average settlement cost. Even if
the average amount of settlements is not affected, increasing the
settlement rate would save insurance companies tens of thousands of
dollars per settlement by avoiding costly litigation.73
Given the amount of attention contingency fee limitations have
received in the legislatures, courts, and literature, it is surprising that
there is relatively little empirical research on such statutes. This
dearth of empirical research may be due to the difficulty in studying

71. See Christopher H. Schmitt, A Medical Mistake, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30,
2003, at 24–27 (reporting 2002 data from the Physician Insurers Association of America that
showed 67.7 percent of medical malpractice claims are dropped or dismissed, 27.4 percent result
in settlement, and 4.9 percent result in trial).
72. See id. (showing 18.4 percent chance of plaintiff receiving a verdict); supra note 57 and
accompanying text (citing statistics that show 27 percent of medical malpractice lawsuits result
in plaintiff verdict).
73. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing April 2002 study that attributed 7
percent of the increase in health insurance premiums to litigation).
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74
the impact of medical malpractice reforms generally. Another
contributing factor, however, may be the undue obsession with
determining who is to blame for rising medical malpractice premiums
and a lack of concern with facts to support such positions. The studies
that have attempted to determine the effect of contingency fee
limitations on medical malpractice liability have produced
inconsistent results. One early study by Patricia Danzon looking at
the effect of various tort reforms on frequency of claims and the
average severity of claims found that contingency fee limitations
reduce claim frequency and severity overall, as well as increase the
settlement rate of claims filed.75 Conversely, a study published three
years later by the same author concluded that contingency fee
limitations did not have “any systematic impact on claim frequency or
severity.”76 One major flaw in these studies, however, is that they
grouped all contingency fee limiting statutes together.77 Although all
types of medical malpractice reform statutes vary from state to state,
the variations in contingency fee limitation statutes are especially
great. For example, it is hardly informative to put Oklahoma’s statute
78
limiting contingency fees to 50 percent of the plaintiff’s net recovery
on the same plane as Delaware’s sliding scale contingency fee statute
which limits contingency fees to 35 percent of the first $100,000
recovered, 25 percent of the next $100,000, and 10 percent of any
amount exceeding $200,000.79 The Oklahoma statute would rarely
constrain lawyers,80 whereas almost all lawyers in Delaware will be

74. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 8–9 (noting the difficulties in
calculating the impact of tort reform, including the variety of tort reform statutes, the lack of
availability of data on tort cases, the enactment of tort reforms in groups instead of individually,
the lag in implementation of reforms due to constitutional challenges, and the difficulty in
determining the status of state tort reform).
75. Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1983).
76. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 78 (Spring 1986).
77. See Patricia M. Danzon, Symposium, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 414 (Spring 1987) (noting a flaw of
the author’s medical malpractice reform impact studies is the inability to “measure separately
the effects of each variant of each law”).
78. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (West 2003).
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (2004).
80. Note, however, that ethical and competitive restrictions limit the contingency an
attorney may charge. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (1983) (requiring
attorneys’ fees to be “reasonable”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1981)
(prohibiting attorneys’ fees which are “clearly excessive”).
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constrained by that state’s statute. Even if the Oklahoma statute did
constrain lawyers, the overall amount a lawyer could collect in fees,
and thus his ability to subsidize frivolous suits, would be substantially
greater in that state. For instance on a one million dollar award, a
lawyer following the Oklahoma statue would collect over three and a
half times as much as a lawyer constrained by the Delaware statute.
Thus, it is not surprising that a study grouping all contingency fee
limitations together would find that the reforms had no statistically
significant effect on medical liability costs.
Another study designed to examine the effectiveness of
contingency fee limitations, as well as other medical malpractice
reforms, measured the effects of the limitations on the probability a
claim would be paid, the amount paid, and the time taken to resolve
the claim.81 This study found that contingency fee limitations
increased the time to filing and decreased the time from filing to
82
closing. The author attributes these changes in timing to reduced
efforts by the attorneys.83 Although this is possible, the delay in time
to filing suits could also mean that plaintiffs’ attorneys are conducting
a more thorough review of incoming claims to weed out cases with
little chance of success. Additionally, the decreased time from filing
to closing could be reflective of an increased settlement rate. Neither
of these factors is considered in this study. The variables measured in
this study are not the variables that contingency limitation statutes
are likely to effect—claim frequency and settlement rate.
Furthermore, the study suffers from the same flaw as the Danzon
study, because it groups all contingency fee limitations into a single
category.84
Later studies suffer from the same inconsistencies and flaws. In a
study of insurance company payouts between 1993 and 2001, a
researcher found that caps on contingent fees resulted in lower claims

81. Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed Medical
Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 663, 663 (1989).
82. Id. at 677.
83. See id. (“The results for placing a limit on plaintiff attorneys’ fees are consistent with
the view that such regulation reduces lawyers’ efforts on malpractice cases.”).
84. The Sloan study includes all statutes that create “some type of numerical limit for
attorneys’ fees in malpractice cases.” Id. at 673 tbl.I. Thus, as in the Danzon study, both the
Oklahoma and Delaware statutes would be categorized the same. See supra notes 75–77 and
accompanying text.

05__DWYER.DOC

2006]

12/19/2006 5:10 PM

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM

629

85
payments by insurers. In a study published less than one year later,
however, the same researcher found contingency fee limitations had
no effect on medical malpractice liability.86 Overall, there are few
empirical studies involving limitations on contingency fees in medical
malpractice cases; the studies that exist contain inconsistencies and
flaws, and as a result, very little can be said about the true effect of
fee limitations on medical malpractice liability costs.

IV. THE EFFECT OF FEE LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
The studies examined in Part III illustrate some of the difficulties
of determining the effects of contingency fee limitations on medical
liability costs. Although data on the effect of fee limitations on
settlement rates and claim frequency would be extremely informative,
what matters to the constitutional analysis is whether or not such
statutes affect insurance premiums. It is undeniable that medical
87
malpractice premiums have been sharply increasing since 1999. The
cause of this increase, however, is less certain. Opponents of medical
malpractice reform argue that the source of the increase is not
medical malpractice litigation at all, but rather economic cycles and
88
insurance companies’ mismanagement of investments. Thus, they
argue that insurance reform, not tort reform, is the answer to rising
insurance premiums.89 This viewpoint is held only by a small
90
minority. The majority of commentators recognize that declining

85. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 18 n.47 (citing Kenneth E. Thorpe,
Remarks on Medical Malpractice in Crisis: Health Care Policy Options at the Council on
Health Care Economics and Policy (Mar. 3, 2003)).
86. See Thorpe, supra note 5, at 26 (finding damage caps were the only tort reform measure
that effectively reduced medical malpractice insurance premiums).
87. See infra Tables 1–5.
88. See Mitchell J. Nathanson, It’s the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining
the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2004) (explaining the minority viewpoint that “the insurance industry is at
fault for these malpractice crises due to investment mismanagement”).
89. See id. at 1083 (“Commentators adhering to this position conclude that because it is the
economy which dictates premium rates, tort reform is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to the
problem.”).
90. See, e.g., Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs., Update on the Medical Litigation Crisis: Not the Result of the “Insurance
Cycle” (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://heal-fl-health-care-pdf.netcomsus.com/resources_
update_report.doc (presenting evidence that the medical liability crisis is caused by an out of
control litigation system and not insurance company mismanagement).
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returns on investment and other factors have an impact on the rising
medical malpractice insurance premiums, but emphasizes that the
data shows that medical malpractice litigation payouts are the
91
greatest contributor to increasing premiums.
To determine what, if any, effect contingency fee limitation
statutes have on medical malpractice insurance premiums, this Note
separates states into four groups based on the status of their
contingency fee limitations between 1999 and 2004: (1) states with
“strict” contingency fee limitations, (2) states with “weak”
contingency fee limitations, (3) states with judicial review of
contingency fees, and (4) states with no restrictions on contingency
fee limits. For the purpose of this analysis, states were determined to
have “strict” or “weak” contingency fee limitations based on whether
their limitations would result in attorneys’ fees on the median medical
92
malpractice award less than the traditional 33 percent contingency
93
fee. States were further divided based on the existence of a cap on
noneconomic damages in an attempt to isolate the effect of the
contingency fee limitation statute alone. It is impossible, however, to
fully separate out the effect of contingency fee limitations, as many
factors influence insurance premiums. First, tort reform measures
such as modifications to the collateral source rule, restrictions on
punitive damages restrictions on joint and several liability, expert
witness limitations, periodic payment allowances, statute of
limitations modifications, restrictions on the use of res ipsa loquitur,
and prescreening requirements may affect premium rates.94 Second,

91. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 15 (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04128t.pdf (“[M]ultiple factors, including falling
investment income and rising reinsurance costs, have contributed to recent increases in
premium rates . . . . [but] losses on medical malpractice claims—which make up the largest part
of insurers’ costs—appear to be the primary driver of rate increases in the long run.”).
92. See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 29 (Sept. 1993), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/
disk1/1993/9329/9329.PDF (stating that the average plaintiffs’ lawyers in medical malpractice
cases collects one third of the recovery).
93. See Cohen, supra note 56 (finding that the median award in medical malpractice trials is
$425,000).
94. See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 92, at 2–3 (explaining that
although studies on tort reform show that only damage caps and mandatory collateral source
offsets reduce medical malpractice costs, this is likely because of insufficient or inaccurate study
of other reforms); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at x–xi (summarizing the
findings of recent empirical studies on the effects of tort reform on overall tort liability).
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95
varying state insurance regulations may affect premium rates. Third,
the level of competition among medical malpractice insurers in a state
could also affect premium rates.96 Fourth, demographic variables such
97
as the percentage of the population living in urban areas, rate of
98
surgery, age of the population, and even the density of attorneys
could affect insurance premiums.99
For each state, the median insurance premium for three
specialties—internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics and
gynecology (OB/Gyn)—was calculated for the year 2004.100 In
addition, the percent change in premiums from 1999 to 2004 was
calculated to assess the intrastate stability of premiums. This
intrastate stability measure is important as it helps take into account
the effect of the individualized state factors discussed above, besides
damage caps and contingency fee limitations, on insurance premiums.
This is especially important because states likely to enact medical
malpractice reform are those already facing the pressures of high
insurance premiums or those with a high underlying propensity for
malpractice litigation. To begin, the data for the twenty-eight states
without any contingency fee limitations is shown below in Table 1.101

95. For an analysis of the effect of state insurance regulations on medical malpractice
premiums, see generally John A. Rizzo, The Impact of Medical Malpractice Rate Regulation, 3 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 482 (1989).
96. For state-by-state data concerning competition in the medical liability insurance
market, see ERIC NORDMAN ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N FOR INS. COMM’RS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE
RECENT CRISIS 35–37 (2004).
97. See Danzon, supra note 77, at 415 (“States that have a higher percentage of the
population in urban areas tend to have a higher frequency of claims per physician and higher
awards.”).
98. See id. (finding that the number of surgeries per capita was positively correlated to the
amount of claims filed per physician and the claim severity).
99. See Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 1970’s:
An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 643 (1985) (“[T]he notion that a
ten percent increase in a state’s lawyer / population ratio leads to almost a like percentage
increase in premiums . . . is a distinct possibility.”).
100. These three specialties were chosen because of data availability. The categories reflect
the wide range of rates among specialties.
101. Data for all tables is drawn from 2004 Annual Rate Survey, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR,
Oct. 2004; 1999 Annual Rate Survey, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct. 1999. The Medical
Liability Monitor is an independent newsletter covering professional liability insurance and risk
management. It is consistently cited by the United States General Accountability Office, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and numerous newspapers and trade journals.
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Table 1a. Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums and Stability in
States without Contingency Fee Restrictions—States with No Cap
on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Alabama

$7,484 (23.34%)

$30,515 (32.53%)

$41,737 (13.55%)

Arkansas

6,936 (134.80)

22,471 (153.78)

41,072 (186.89)

Florida

41,092 (133.33)

155,370 (174.61)

180,171 (94.43)

Georgia

12,916 (105.60)

46,215 (204.91)

57,515 (66.43)

Kentucky

10,802 (76.55)

45,230 (67.89)

59,280 (48.77)

Minnesota

4,283 (-2.37)

12,848 (37.36)

22,950 (28.90)

Mississippi

12,667 (197.58)

57,266 (249.02)

80,120 (137.49)

Nevada

14,062 (22.34)

49,650 (26.42)

62,854 (-0.34)

State

New Hampshire

9,051 (63.25)

34,304 (47.00)

53,936 (50.07)

North Carolina

10,394 (92.91)

48,417 (127.28)

72,445 (96.77)

Pennsylvania

25,020 (264.12)

92,772 (407.77)

119,113 (308.74)

Rhode Island

10,552 (85.15)

39,145 (62.44)

87,952 (52.40)

South Carolina

9,094 (520.50)

40,950 (541.93)

47,739 (528.14)

Texas

24,728 (131.12)

72,460 (186.35)

95,677 (149.92)

Vermont

6,422 (34.97)

20,177 (41.14)

43,729 (78.13)

Wyoming

16,137 (47.40)

52,272 (70.90)

66,727 (40.66)

Average

13,852 (120.66)

51,254 (151.96)

70,813 (117.56)

Median

10,677 (89.03)

45,723 (99.09)

61,067 (72.28)

Std. Deviation

9,329 (126.84)

34,022 (146.09)

37,643 (133.80)

Table 1b. $500,000 or Greater Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$10,619 (23.98%)

$40,882 (40.96%)

$54,420 (11.36%)

Louisiana

16,092 (113.51)

51,377 (117.05)

80,089 (98.10)

Missouri

19,140 (118.74)

65,131 (87.58)

93,625 (85.76)

New Mexico

12,586 (182.38)

56,639 (81.86)

70,808 (106.80)

8,294 (75.76)

24,588 (95.40)

32,037 (48.13)

State
Alaska

North Dakota

05__DWYER.DOC

2006]
South Dakota

12/19/2006 5:10 PM

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM

633

3,848 (52.28)

12,569 (86.57)

21,072 (81.97)

Virginia

11,184 (182.46)

40,851 (157.94)

62,205 (131.11)

West Virginia

23,323 (80.63)

77,915 (66.33)

113,966 (42.43)

Average

13,136 (103.72)

46,244 (91.71)

66,028 (75.71)

Median

11,885 (97.07)

46,130 (87.07)

66,506 (83.87)

Std. Deviation

6,196 (57.36)

21,230 (34.65)

30,720 (39.07)

Table 1c. Less than $500,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
State
Colorado

Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$12,706 (52.69%)

$44,927 (65.18%)

$51,074 (65.83%)

Idaho

5,176 (44.44)

19,224 (36.29)

31,048 (37.31)

Montana

11,306 (70.45)

48,249 (146.58)

80,199 (130.30)

Ohio

20,202 (113.12)

68,436 (117.64)

94,513 (101.57)

Average

12,348 (70.18)

45,209 (91.42)

64,209 (83.75)

Median

12,006 (61.57)

46,588 (91.41)

65,637 (83.70)

Std. Deviation

6,174 (30.62)

20,199 (49.86)

28,555 (40.67)

Table 1d. Summary
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Average

$13,433 (108.61%)

$48,959 (126.10%)

$68,502 (100.77%)

Median

11,245 (82.89)

45,723 (87.08)

62,530 (80.05)

Std. Deviation

7,928 (101.03)

28,507 (115.63)

33,618 (104.51)

Tables 1a–d show that doctors in unregulated states, especially
specialists, are facing extremely high and ever-increasing malpractice
premiums. Table 1d demonstrates that on average, rates have more
than doubled for all three specialties. The large standard deviations,
however, show that broad generalizations based on these data are not
warranted. Table 2 examines the effect of statutes allowing judicial
review of contingency fees on malpractice premiums.
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Table 2a. 2004 Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums and Stability
in States with Judicial Review of Contingency Fees—States with
No Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
State
Arizona

Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$19,991 (122.81%)

$69,917 (131.62%)

$83,515 (79.02%)

Iowa

6,400 (53.29)

25,820 (79.43)

43,407 (51.92)

Average

13,195 (88.05)

47,719 (105.53)

63,461 (65.47)

Median

13,195 (88.05)

47,719 (105.53)

63,461 (65.47)

Std. Deviation

9,610 (49.16)

30,969 (36.90)

28,361 (19.16)

Table 2b. $500,000 or Greater Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$10,284 (50.88%)

$37,012 (50.90%)

$61,684 (50.89%)

Maryland

14,171 (113.45)

52,288 (80.55)

102,587 (53.39)

Nebraska

3,286 (23.84)

11,948 (5.73)

19,713 (13.96)

Washington

14,096 (73.38)

45,416 (54.96)

65,252 (55.78)

Average

10,459 (65.39)

36,666 (48.03)

62,309 (43.51)

Median

12,190 (62.13)

41,214 (52.93)

63,468 (52.14)

Std. Deviation

5,115 (37.91)

17,623 (31.11)

33,891 (19.80)

State
Hawaii

Table 2c. Less than $500,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
State
Kansas

Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$8,803 (90.98%)

$32,304 (69.33%)

$44,447 (47.17%)
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Table 2d. Summary
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Average

$11,004 (75.52%)

$39,201 (67.50%)

$60,086 (50.30%)

Median

10,284 (73.38)

37,012 (69.33)

61,684 (51.92)

Std. Deviation

5,575 (35.80)

18,749 (38.03)

27,499 (19.14)

Surprisingly, Tables 2a–d show that the seven states with statutes
authorizing judicial review of contingency fee arrangements fared the
best out of the four groups of states. Many of these states, however,
have small urban populations, and as noted above this plays a
significant role in insurance premiums.102
Table 3a. 2004 Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums and Stability
in States with Weak Restrictions on Contingency Fees—States with
No Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

New Jersey

$19,135 (127.42%)

$54,761 (145.26%)

$96,732 (114.17%)

Tennessee

8,566 (93.31)

32,544 (79.86)

48,841 (82.50)

State

Oklahoma

9,227 (189.32)

31,975 (160.48)

39,473 (137.67)

Oregon

8,552 (105.02)

31,610 (129.67)

43,535 (100.81)

Average

11,370 (128.77)

37,722 (128.82)

57,145 (108.79)

Median

8,896 (116.22)

32,259 (137.47)

46,188 (107.49)

Std. Deviation

5,186 (42.78)

11,365 (34.98)

26,668 (23.22)

Table 3b. $500,000 or Greater Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
State
Massachusetts

Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$12,908 (91.48%)

$39,474 (80.88%)

$105,006 (72.38%)

102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting urban areas on average have higher
awards and higher rates of filing).
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Table 3c. Less than $500,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$10,209 (80.21%)

$56,791 (127.22%)

$80,180 (90.24%)

Michigan

23,234 (125.77)

82,930 (198.86)

82,930 (66.57)

Average

16,722 (102.99)

69,861 (163.04)

81,555 (78.41)

Median

16,722 (102.99)

69,861 (163.04)

81,555 (78.41)

9,210 (32.22)

18,483 (50.66)

1,945 (16.74)

State
Utah

Std. Deviation

Table 3d. Summary
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Average

$13,119 (116.08%)

$47,155 (131.75%)

$70,957 (94.91%)

Median

10,209 (105.02)

39,474 (129.67)

80,180 (90.24)

5,827 (36.79)

19,040 (42.46)

26,722 (24.90)

Std. Deviation

Tables 3a–d show that “weak” contingency fee limitations have
no effect on medical malpractice premiums. This is to be expected, as
such restrictions mandate the status quo, setting contingency fee
limitations at or above the average percentage of the award that
attorneys retain.103
Table 4a. 2004 Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums and Stability
in States with Strict Restrictions on Contingency Fees—States with
No Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$20,557 (177.07%)

$61,209 (115.31%)

$126,766 (185.85%)

11,137 (159.83)

33,515 (119.09)

52,468 (53.82)

Illinois

29,080 (81.01)

78,164 (69.76)

122,889 (70.06)

New York

12,971 (-32.44)

55,623 (-0.03)

78,774 (-23.05)

State
Connecticut
Delaware

103.

See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
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Maine

7,004 (13.11)

22,456 (18.35)

37,361 (17.33)

Average

16,150 (79.72)

50,193 (64.50)

83,651 (60.80)

Median

12,971 (81.01)

55,623 (69.76)

78,774 (53.82)

Std. Deviation

8,739 (90.71)

22,253 (54.51)

40,427 (78.57)

Table 4b. $500,000 or Greater Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
State

Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

N/A

N/A

N/A

None

Table 4c. Less than $500,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

$11,220 (25.78%)

$35,880 (48.77%)

$58,608 (30.12%)

Indiana

8,704 (209.29)

33,506 (111.03)

52,729 (106.42)

Wisconsin

6,505 (24.74)

21,504 (31.08)

31,504 (16.11)

Average

8,810 (86.60)

30,297 (63.63)

47,614 (50.88)

Median

8,704 (25.78)

33,506 (48.77)

52,729 (30.12)

Std. Deviation

2,359 (106.25)

7,707 (41.99)

14,258 (48.60)

State
California

Table 4d. Summary
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Average

$13,397 (82.30%)

$42,732 (64.17%)

$70,137 (57.08%)

Median

11,179 (53.40)

34,698 (59.27)

55,669 (41.97)

Std. Deviation

7,724 (89.11)

20,149 (46.92)

36,604 (65.03)

Table 4d, however, shows that strict contingency fee limitations
do tend to have an effect on malpractice premiums. On average,
states that enacted “strict” fee restrictions had approximately half the
rate increase from 1999–2004 in general surgery and OB/Gyn
premiums than states with weak restrictions or no restrictions at all.
Although not as drastic, the states with strict fee restrictions also saw
much slower increases in internal medicine premiums. Such stability,
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however, was not seen by all states with strict fee restrictions.
Connecticut, Delaware, and Indiana all saw premiums double
between 1999 and 2004. Finally, Table 5 looks at overall national
averages for medical malpractice premiums.
Table 5. Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums and Stability
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Average

$13,043 (100.81%)

$46,344 (108.78%)

$67,929 (85.90%)

Median

11,160 (88.06)

42,939 (81.37)

61,944 (68.32)

Std. Deviation

7,199 (85.42)

24,630 (94.31)

31,706 (84.84)

Overall, the tables show one clear trend—medical malpractice
insurance premiums are exorbitantly high and are continuing to
increase at alarming rates. Every state but one has seen double-digit
percentage increases in premiums since 1999.104 Further, twenty-four
states have seen insurance premiums double since 1999 in at least one
of the specialties examined. In fact, the average national rate increase
in both internal medicine and general surgery is over 100 percent.
States that have enacted caps on damages appear to fare slightly
better both in terms of the amount of premiums and the stability of
premiums.

104. Table 4a shows New York has actually seen a significant reduction in medical
malpractice premiums since 1999. A large reason for this is that New York’s 1999 premiums
were the highest in the nation ($19,200 for internal medicine, $55,638 for general surgery, and
$102,373 for OB/Gyn). See 1999 Annual Rate Survey, supra note 101. Also, despite the decrease
in premiums, New York is still among the twenty-one states the American Medical Association
has identified as in medical liability crisis. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Liability Crisis Map,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (defining
a state in crisis as one where patients are losing access to medical care). The other states
identified as crisis states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
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Table 6a. Comparison of Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums
and Stability—States with Noneconomic Damages Caps
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

$13,861 (111.86%)

No Cap on Noneconomic
Damages
(27 States)

OB/Gyn

$48,791 (128.89%) $70,621 (101.89%)

$500,000 or Greater Cap on
Noneconomic Damages
(13 States)

12,295 (90.98)

42,776 (77.44)

67,882 (65.54)

Less than $500,000 Cap on
Noneconomic Damages
(10 States)

11,807 (83.75)

44,375 (95.20)

60,723 (69.16)

The amount of the caps appears to have a slight effect on the
amount of the insurance premiums, but no effect on their stability.
Contingency fee statutes seem to produce even greater
stabilizing effects than statutory caps, but have no apparent effect on
the actual amount of premiums.
Table 6b. Comparison of Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums
and Stability—States with Contingency Fee Restrictions
2004 Insurance Premiums (Percent Change, 1999–2004)
Internal
Medicine

General
Surgery

OB/Gyn

Strict Fee
Restrictions
(8 States)

$13,397 (82.30%)

$42,732 (64.17%)

$70,137 (57.08%)

Weak Fee
Restrictions
(7 States)

13,119 (116.08)

47,155 (131.75)

70,957 (94.90)

Judicial Review
of Fees
(7 States)

11,004 (75.52)

39,201 (67.50)

60,086 (50.31)

No Fee
Restriction
(28 States)

13,433 (108.61)

48,959 (126.10)

68,502 (100.77)
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It is clear, however, that not all contingency fee statutes are
created equally. Those characterized as “weak” show no effect on
insurance premiums, whereas those characterized as “strict” show a
noticeable effect. Finally, the combination of caps on noneconomic
damages and contingency fee limitations appears to be effective in
limiting malpractice premiums and growth of premiums. Although
only three states have such a combination, the data can still be
instructive. Looking at the data from California, it is understandable
why Congress may want to model national medical malpractice
reform on California’s statute. California ranks in the top twelve for
stability of premiums in all three specialties.105 This is especially
impressive given California’s demographics—its many urban
106
107
centers, its propensity for litigation, and numerous other factors.
Given that the foregoing data fails to take into account many key
factors, it is important not to overgeneralize its conclusions. The main
purpose of this Note is to encourage legislatures, courts, and
commentators to conduct further research into the efficacy of
contingency fee limitations. The data augments the argument that fee
limitations reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums and
offers support for courts, under the extremely lenient rational basis
review, to hold that such statutes do not violate the equal protection
clause. As noted in Part II, to declare a statute unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause, the challenger must show that “the
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could
not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker.”108 It is clear from the data that a reasonable
legislature could determine that contingency fee limitations are an
appropriate way to curb rising medical malpractice costs.

105. California ranks ninth lowest in increase in internal medicine premiums, twelfth lowest
in general surgery premium increases, and ninth lowest in Ob / Gyn premium increases.
106. For example, the eight states with a lower percentage increase on internal medicine
premiums were New York, Nevada, Alaska, Alabama, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Maine, and
Minnesota. Besides New York, discussed supra note 104, all of these states have much smaller
urban populations than California.
107. See Christine McCarthy, Exemplary and Aggravated Damages in Medical Negligence
Litigation, 6 J.L. & MED. 187, 187 (1998) (reporting that California is the most litigious
jurisdiction in the United States).
108. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1970).
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CONCLUSION
The problem is clear. Medical malpractice insurance rates are
rising at astronomical rates across the country. Physicians facing
skyrocketing premiums are being forced to stop performing high-risk
procedures or to enter an early retirement.109 Some states are in better
shape than others, but it appears that none are safe from the potential
deadly consequences of pricing both doctors and patients out of the
healthcare market. Unfortunately, the solution is not nearly as clear
as the problem. The data presented in this Note show that
contingency fee limitations may stabilize medical malpractice
insurance premiums, but cannot reduce premiums in states that are
already facing a severe crisis. Even the highly touted cap on
noneconomic damages does not appear to solve the problem without
being paired with other reforms.
Although both measures will probably survive lenient judicial
scrutiny, this does not mean legislators need not delve more deeply
into the problem. The first decade of the twenty-first century placed
medical malpractice reform in the spotlight, making it crucial to
examine the efficiency of the proposed reforms. Given the magnitude
of the crisis, the healthcare system cannot afford ineffective or stop
gap reform measures. Empirical research is needed to determine what
effects various medical malpractice reforms have on medical liability
costs, insurance premiums, and patient care.

109. See Thorpe, supra note 5, at 8 (noting the dire consequences rising malpractice
premiums are having on doctor livelihood and patient care).

